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Abstract
Buddhism has nothing in principle against either human en-
hancement or lifespan extending technologies. Everything de-
pends on motivation. In the case of human enhancement tech-
nologies in general, the argument that enhancing humans is un-
ethical because it commits an unnatural act is found wanting be-
cause it relies on the untenable premise that the natural and the
ethical are identical. However, Somparn Promta’s argument to
the effect that in Buddhism there is no unnatural act is criticized
because the argument conflates two different senses of “natural”,
one being natural law and the other presupposed in the premise
that the ethical and the natural are identical. Then the paper moves
on to discuss the central idea in Buddhism concerning the empti-
ness of all things. Since there can be no essence or core of iden-
tity of anything, person or non-person, any argument based on
there being a subsisting person whose body is to be enhanced or
whose life is to be extended is based on an untenable premise.
Finally the paper discusses Steven Horrobin’s recent attempt to
base the value of the extended lifespan on the ability to enjoy
more pleasures. This is also found wanting because the extended
life will contain not only pleasures but also pain and boredom.
Moreover, the value of life, either extended or not, lies more on
how well it is lived rather than how much pleasures the subject
can consume.
Introduction
This chapter proposes to discuss the Buddhist viewpoints on hu-
man enhancement and extension of human lifespan. Current technolo-
gies are being developed with the aim of providing bodily and cognitive
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enhancements of human beings in very significant ways. Developments
in human-computer integration, made possible by nanotechnology and
increased understanding of the workings of the inner mechanisms of the
brain, have made scenes in science fiction a likely scenario in the near
future. There are many applications of these technologies; for example,
patients suffering from memory loss due to the decrease in the activity of
the brain can have those functions enhanced or restored through implan-
tation of computer chips inside the brain itself, so that the neurons and
the switches inside the chip can become integrated and interact with one
another seamlessly. Further research is also being done on how to restore
sight back to blind people through integration of artificial eyes that trans-
mit visual information to the brain or to restore the lost functions of the
visual processing parts of the brain itself.
Another area of research on extending human capabilities focuses
on extending the lifespan itself. Recently there has been increased un-
derstanding of the mechanisms underlying the aging process, and there
is a hope that one day humans could live indefinitely through mastering
the art of manipulating these aging processes or stopping them before
they happen. This requires the same kind of sophisticated technologies
that are being developed for physical and cognitive enhancements al-
luded to above. Futurist Ray Kurzweil, for example, foresees the day
when human beings will become “transhumans” or “posthumans”, both
terms signifying an emergence of a new type of organism, one that will
perhaps supersede the human form we are familiar with. According to
Kurzweil, it will be shortly possible for a human being to upload all the
content of his or her mind onto a huge server, only to be downloaded to
a new body when the opportune moment arrives. In that way it is fore-
seen that human beings (or a later version thereof) can live indefinitely.
Though this research work is still at its beginning stages, it car-
ries a strong potential for altering the lives of us human beings forever.
Moreover, it will not only affect the lives of individuals, but also of hu-
man societies as a whole. These enhancement technologies will have
tremendous impact on human relations. When only some groups of hu-
mans are enhanced and others are not, inequality among the groups will
widen, and this surely will lead to a host of social, cultural and political
problems. Furthermore, even among the enhanced beings themselves,
there will be changes in how they relate to one another. For example,
when one’s lifespan is increased significantly, there will need to be changes
in life insurance schemes and policies concerning retirement, and age
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regulations. These are just small examples in the changes in the charac-
teristics of society due to enhancement technologies.
It is the aim of this paper to reflect on these developments through
the lens of Buddhist teachings.1 Even though there are many schools of
Buddhism, chief among which are the Theravada and Mahayana tradi-
tions, what is offered here is a common thread that runs through all Bud-
dhist schools. Both Mahayana and Theravada schools rejects the idea of
the self as an inherently subsisting and enduring entity, and it is this
thread that is relied on as the basis of Buddhist thought presented in this
paper. Furthermore, one of the most important aspects of Buddhist teach-
ings both the Theravada and Mahayana schools is that the emphasis on
motivation as the basis on which ethical value of action rests. Thus ac-
cording to Buddhism action such as enhancing the physical and cogni-
tive functions of humans or extending their lifespan is not good or bad in
itself, it is the motivation behind the act that is ultimately responsible.
The basic saying in Buddhism is that when the motivation is good or
“wholesome” then the act is also good, and vice versa, and a motivation
is good when it is directed at the well-being of other sentient beings and
away from the egoistic attitude of the subject. Another important aspect
of the teaching is that the subject itself is constituted not by a self-sub-
sisting self or soul as in other religions, but by a series of ever changing
episodes of bodily and mental activities. This point has a very strong
impact on much of the motivation behind enhancement and lifespan in-
creasing technologies. These technologies are perhaps motivated by the
desire to be stronger, more intelligent and to live longer, but all these are
effects of the ego itself. It is the ego that wants to be stronger, to be more
intelligent, and to live longer. According to Buddhism these motivations
are unwholesome indeed.
Another point concerns the conceptual issue of extending one’s
lifespan itself. In attempting to increase the lifespan, it seems to be the
individual ego that wants to extend its stay in the world for as long as
possible. But according to the Buddhist analysis this is clearly impos-
sible as the ego does not stay the same from a moment to another mo-
ment, and there is no underlying entity that remains unchanged behind
all these changes. This is a metaphysical point, and this paper will try to
develop this point in philosophical terms. This, if true, will show that the
motivation for extending one’s lifespan or to increase one’s physical and
cognitive abilities simply to extend the duration or the existence of the
ego is always a wrong one because it is based on a wrong conception of
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However, this does not mean that Buddhism is not completely
opposed to human enhancement or increased lifespan. It is only opposed
to performing these out of wrong or unwholesome motivations. When
these technologies are used on humans for altruistic purposes, then they
can do really good things for both individuals and their societies. The
hard part lies in how to consider the use of these technologies for altruis-
tic purposes.
Human Enhancement
According to the EU document on the issue, human enhance-
ment is defined as “a modification aimed at improving human perfor-
mance and brought about by science-based and technology-based inter-
ventions in the human body” (Directorate General for Internal Policies,
2009). Basically speaking, attempts at enhancing humans originated from
attempts to restore the human body and human functioning that has been
lost due to illness. Thus enhancing or restoring can be performed through
the use of medication, surgical means (for example in case of restoring
the use of limbs), implanting device to restore sight or hearing, and other
measures. As technologies aimed primarily at restoring the human func-
tions are being developed, it is but a short step until someone imagines
that the same technologies can also be used to enhance human capabili-
ties in the way that may exceed those of a normal, average human being.
For example, a drug may, prima facie, be developed with the objective
of treating the memory function of the brain, which has been lost through
illness such as Alzheimer’s. However, if the drug is such that it can be
used in normal people so that they have more powerful memories, then
the issue seems to exceed that of normal medicine. It is here that the
ethical questions surrounding human enhancement are centered. There
seems to be a basic conceptual distinction on this issue between the thera-
peutic purpose of enhancing technologies and their newer, non-thera-
peutic and augmentative, purposes. Due to the latter, the goal of the tech-
nologies is not merely to restore the normal functions, but to push the
boundary of what it is to be a human being, possibly in the future even to
create an entirely new kind of being itself.
However, the distinction between the therapeutic and augmenta-
tive use of human enhancement technologies has been criticized by some
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as not being very clear cut, since it is the same technologies that can be
employed on both sides, and since the very concept of a normal human
being can be a contested. This shows that the most salient ethical issue
surrounding human enhancement is the question what constitutes a nor-
mal human being. What most people find objectionable about human
enhancement is that the technologies are poised to create a new kind of
human being. Talks about human enhancement seem to conjure an im-
age of the grotesque __ a body significantly different from a typical hu-
man __ and this seems to be a source of uneasiness. Here the assumption
is that the ethical corresponds with the normal or the natural. Any at-
tempt to diverge from the norm, to create a kind of human being that is
too different from it, would simply be unethical. The story of the Fran-
kenstein monster is a very good example of this. The doctor who created
the monster committed an unethical act because he tried to overcome
nature. By creating the monster, the doctor violated a natural and ethical
norm. This feeling that the ethical coincides with the normal and natural
is also a leading cause of the public backlash against the genetic modifi-
cation technologies. It is not a surprise to find people labeling food cre-
ated through these technologies “Frankenstein” food. The root cause is
one and the same.
On the issue of human enhancement technologies, what seems to
be ethical objectionable at the first sight is the possibility that humans
will be created which violate the view that the ethical and the normal. If
the purpose of the enhancement is not therapeutic, then, given the pre-
dictably more widespread and powerful technologies in the near future,
it is quite likely that many of the enhancing technologies will become
routine, with the consequence that a new type of human being, if not a
totally distinct kind, will emerge. This will certainly violate the assump-
tion that the normal and the ethical are one and the same. For example, it
is conceivable that a drug will be available which significantly enhances
memory capacity of those who take it. So when the drug is in general
use, we will have created a new type of human who have a more power-
ful memory than those who do not take the drug. If a critical threshold of
population who take the drug is crossed, then even the conception of
what constitutes the ‘normal’ itself could change. In this scenario, the
‘normal’ will be those who take the enhancing drug, leaving those who
don’t to be branded as out of the normal range. Those who find this
scenario ethical objectionable typically reasons that the new norm is un-
natural, hence it cannot be an ethical one.
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Another ethical issue concerning human enhancement concerns
groups of people rather than individuals. Suppose a group of human be-
ings are enhanced in one way or another. Suppose, for example, that the
group takes the memory-enhancing drug on a regular basis. What will
happen will be that there are other groups who might not be as fortunate
and do not have the opportunity to take the drugs regularly. The result
could be that, in the long run, the group that take the drug will enjoy
more cognitive and memory capabilities than those who don't. This will
surely be used as a justification for segregation, only that this time the
issue that separates one group from another is not entirely socio-cultural,
but physical. This is tremendously important, because it is based on in-
ternal physical characteristics, whereas in the past it was based on socio-
cultural characteristics (such as the fact that one is born to such and such
family). It is true that certain physical characteristics were used in the
past to segregate people into groups, such as skin colors and so on, but
with the enhancement technologies the segregating characteristics will
be those that enable those who possess the new found abilities to per-
form tasks that might not be possible for those who are not so enhanced.
This is in stark contrast with the earlier physical characteristic such as
skin color which was not relevant as a marker of more enhanced capa-
bilities. The group who take the memory-enhancing drug will in theory
be able to remember more things and remember them more clearly than
those who do not take the drug. Hence it appears that the human en-
hancement technologies have a much more serious impact on the issue
of equality among groups of people than any natural physical character-
istic ever could.
Of the two main ethical concerns surrounding human enhance-
ment __ the view that the normal and the ethical are one and the same, and
the other view that the technologies could segregate humans into un-
equal groups __ the former one is more basic. We can imagine a scenario
where every human being receives the benefits of these technologies, so
nobody will be left out. In this case there will be no inequality among the
people since everybody will become equally enhanced. However, even
if everybody is enhanced in the same way, the first ethical objection seems
to remain, because in this case everybody then deviates from the norm,
so the whole development becomes unethical.
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A Buddhist Response
We will discuss each of the two main ethical concerns of human
enhancement and see how the Buddhist responds to them. The first is-
sue, as we have seen, concerns the identification of the normal and the
ethical. On this topic, Somparn Promta has argued that according to Bud-
dhism nothing is in fact unnatural. That is, Promta sees that in Buddhism
there is nothing unnatural since everything has to follow natural law.
Creating a Frankenstein is a natural act since the creation has to follow
natural laws, Frankenstein himself, is therefore an object in the natural
scheme of things. Here is what Promta says on the issue:
In Buddhism, morality can be separated from the concept
of being natural because according to Buddhist teaching
it seems impossible to say that such and such a phenom-
enon is unnatural. Buddhism proposes that the moral good-
ness or badness attributable to any action depends solely
on the moral properties. Actually, Buddhism does not think
that there is anything unnatural. Buddhism believes in the
Five Laws of Nature as we have observed previously, and
thinks that there is nothing which is beyond these laws of
nature. In Buddhist texts, for example, reproductive meth-
ods other than the sexual one we are acquainted with are
mentioned. For those of us who never perceive such meth-
ods, they could be considered unnatural. But they are natu-
ral in the sense that they are permitted to appear in the
universe through any of the five natural laws (Promta,
2005).
The Five Natural Laws mentioned in the quote above are: physi-
cal law (utuniyama), biological law (bijaniyama), law of action
(kammaniyama), law of mind (cittaniyama), and law of dhamma
(dhammaniyama) (Promta, 2005). In short, these laws represent all ac-
tion in nature, both physical and psychological. Physical law refers to
what is happening in the physical world. Biological law refers to what
happens in the biological world; thus genetic inheritance, for example,
belongs to this law. Law of action refers to the relation of cause and
effect that obtains in the world. The fourth law, that of the mind, covers
action of the mind and the relation between the mind and the world,
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while the last law covers everything else. We don’t need to concern our-
selves with the details of each of the laws here. Suffice it to say that these
laws cover everything in the psycho-physical world. According to Promta,
nothing is unnatural in Buddhism because everything that happens does
so according to one or more of these five laws. Furthermore, he argues
that, since nothing is unnatural, any argument purporting to show that an
action is ethical because it leads to unnatural result is not tenable as it
rests on a false foundation. Promta uses this argument to claim that hu-
man genetic research, for example, is not unethical in itself because the
research necessarily follows natural laws.
It is quite clear that this argument rests on an equivocation of the
meaning of the word “natural”. On the one hand, things in the physical
world proceed according to natural laws; this much is totally
uncontroversial. On the other, however, when someone makes an argu-
ment to the effect that an action is unethical because it leads to unnatural
products such as a grotesquely enhanced human, they are not referring to
the natural law, but the fact that the resulting product is out of the range
of the normal for a thing of its kind. When one creates a Frankenstein,
the act is unethical precisely because it distorts what has come to be
agreed upon as normal. The fact that creating a Frankenstein is only pos-
sible through reliance on natural laws is not relevant to the ethical value
of the act. It may be the case that Buddhism teaches that everything hap-
pens according to natural laws, but that does not imply that acts which
create grotesquely unnatural things are for that reason an ethical one.
What constitutes ethical value of an action in Buddhism is not whether
the action is natural or not.
In Buddhism what determines the ethical value of an act is not its
functioning according to natural laws, but the motivation behind the act
itself. An act, considered in and of itself, is neutral regarding its moral
value; it is the motivation of the one who is doing the action that is im-
portant. If the motivation is such that it leads to harmful results, then an
act is an unethical one, but if the motivation is for beneficial purposes,
then the very same act can become ethical. Buddhist ethics is sometimes
regarded as a consequentialist one, but an important difference from a
standard consequentialist ethics is that Buddhism pays much more atten-
tion to the motivation behind an act, and it is the motivation that is more
important in determining an ethical value of an act rather than purely the
consequences. For example, in developing a human enhancement tech-
nology, such as one that enables a human to hear better. The act can be a
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good one just in case the motivation is for the good of everyone as a
whole, such as when one tries to develop the technology in order to help
deaf people. However, if the motivation is a selfish or narrow-minded
one, such as developing the technology out of the desire to gain mon-
etary benefits just for oneself, then it is unethical.
Sometimes, however, the motivation can be mixed, as in the case
where one develops a technology motivated both by the desire to help
the deaf and to reap material reward. In this case Buddhism would say
that the action would be both ethical and unethical. It is ethical just to the
extent that the act is performed out of altruistic motivation, and it is
unethical just in case where there is a selfish motive. There is no direct
contradiction here since each of the ethical values are dependent on their
respective motivations.
In one of the most important passages in the Buddhist Canon,
there are the following verses that emphasize the supreme role that the
mind plays in determining the value of an action:
Mind precedes all mental states. Mind is their chief; they
are all mind-wrought. If with an impure mind a person
speaks or acts suffering follows him like the wheel that
follows the foot of the ox.
Mind precedes all mental states. Mind is their chief; they
are all mind-wrought. If with a pure mind a person speaks
or acts happiness follows him like his never-departing
shadow (Yamakavagga, 2010).
This passage opens the Dhammapada, one of the most widely
read Buddhist scriptures. It says that the mind is the most important thing;
everything proceeds from the mind and everything also is made up by
the mind. Thus if the quality of the mind is not pure, such as when one
performs an action with selfish attitude, or with one or more of the de-
filements such as greed, anger and delusion, then the act itself cannot be
said to be pure. On the contrary, if the quality of the mind is pure, then
the act itself will also be pure. The act in both cases here can well be one
and the same, but it becomes vastly different in terms of its ethical value
due to the quality of the mind that is involved. Thus, in the case of hu-
man enhancement technologies, what is at issue is not the act per se, but
the quality of mind behind it.
If this is the case, then what about an act such as enhancing sol-
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diers to become more powerful than ordinary human beings? Could such
an act be ethical according to Buddhism? This question can be asked in
another way, which is: Could there be a positive, altruistic motivation
behind creation and enhancement of human soldiers so that they are more
powerful than their enemies? Could there be a good motivation behind
an act of war at all? The answer is yes. We could imagine a situation
where creation of robo-soldiers who are half machines-half humans for
certain altruistic purposes, such as saving humankind from devastation.
On the contrary, if the reason behind the creation of enhanced humans is
not an altruistic one, but the opposite, such as when one enhances one’s
body in order to defeat others for the sake of material gain only for one-
self, then the act is certainly an unethical one according to Buddhism.
Extension of Human Lifespan
One of most interesting applications of human enhancement tech-
nologies concerns how the technologies will be used to extend the length
of human life. Knowledge and technologies are being developed that
extend the lifespan beyond what has been hitherto possible. This requires
highly advanced knowledge into the working of the human body at the
cellular and molecular level, something that is being done with the de-
velopment of nanotechnology and human enhancement technologies. As
is the case with other applications of human enhancement technologies,
the goal is not only to restore the normal function of a healthy human
body, but to enhance it, in this case in order that the normally aging body
will function in the same way as does a healthy, youthful one. Human-
kind has searched for millennia for the fountain of youth, something which
promised to defeat the most feared enemy of life, namely death itself.
Recent advances in sophisticated technologies have appeared to make
this age-old search closer to reality.
As with the other applications of human enhancement technolo-
gies, the normal application is focused on treating diseases and disabili-
ties that afflict human beings as they get older. Diseases such as
Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s attack humans when they get old, and tech-
nologies are being developed to combat them, mostly by studying the
working of the brain and to restore its functions through various means.
For example, chips can be planted inside an elderly person’s brain to
help the brain function normally. This will prevent brain deterioration
and thus postpone dementia. Here it is quite clear that the line between
the restorative or therapeutic function and the non-therapeutic, enhanc-
ing functions of human enhancement technologies are becoming blurred.
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The problem lies in how one can specify, clearly and objectively, exactly
what is the normal functioning of the brain and what is the goal that
restorative technologies should aim for. What, exactly, is the “normal”
level of brain functioning for someone who is, say, eighty-five years old?
Shouldn't the brain of a “normal” 85-year-old function in a slightly less
efficient manner than the brain of a 25-year-old? To “restore” the brain
of an 85-year-old so that it functions exactly as well as that of a 25-year-
old could be regarded as an “enhancement” beyond what is normal for
people of that age. If this enhancement is accepted, then there would not
seem to be any barrier against an attempt to extend the capabilities of a
25-year-old brain, perhaps to extend it beyond any brain of any naturally
existing human being. Again all this hinges on our conception of what is
“normal”. If it shifts, then the distinction or the line between restorative
and purely enhancing technologies will shift too.
So in a nutshell, the ethical problem of human enhancement tech-
nologies with regarding to the elderly and extension of lifespan is this: Is
it ethical to use the technologies in such a way as to extend the lifespan
of an individual further and further? Does extending the lifespan mean
that we humans are again doing something that is unnatural, hence un-
ethical at least according to some views? These questions are difficult to
answer without a clear conception of what constitutes the normal func-
tioning of an elderly human being. If, as is likely, one is to insist that the
normal functioning of an elderly should be exactly the same as that of a
healthy, youthful human being, then one seems to admit that enhance-
ment beyond what is therapeutically required is all right, since there is
no clear line between the two to begin with.
The ethical value of extending lifespan can be determined roughly
in two ways. The first way is to look at death itself. If death is something
to be avoided at all cost, then extending lifespan for the purpose of avoid-
ing death seems to be tenable. If everything else is equal, one should
always choose living rather than death if death is always to be avoided
according to this point of view. Epicurus is well known to have a view on
death such that death can be nothing to us, because when we are living,
death does not occur to us, so death is purely negative when we are liv-
ing and thus can be nothing to us. However, when we are dead, we are no
more. We are totally non-existent and since there is no “we”, death can-
not be anything to us at all. If this argument is sound, then death cannot
be a factor in any argument at all. But if this is the case, then any argu-
ment in favor of extending lifespan cannot depend on the fact that we
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would like to avoid death.
A Buddhist Response
Steve Horrobin argues that life has an intrinsic value such that it
is always desirable to extend the lifespan and that since the person is a
process rather than an entity, lifespan extension has an “inalienable” in-
trinsic value (Horrobin 2006a; 2006b). Extension of lifespan enables the
person to realize his or her potentials and to live out all kinds of dreams
and goals that would not have been possible if the lifespan were limited
by ones normal biological nature. In other words, according to Horrobin
one should always strive for extending one’s lifespan because not only is
life intrinsically worthwhile in itself, but the extended life would make it
possible for one to become anybody or to enjoy any kind of pleasures
that life has to offer. Horrobin’s example is particularly telling:
Consider the notion and ideal of a Renaissance Man. A
person fully integrated with their cultural milieu was once
at least possible. What hope now that a single person may
within the scope of their lifetime understand or know all
concerning even the single discipline of biology, let alone
further and other realms of knowledge? The harsh and
bitter rigours of the Procrustean lifespan cut us off, in-
creasingly, from the possibility of integrated experience
and understanding of our own created realm of culture
and of knowledge (Horrobin 2006a, p. 286).
So Horrobin would like to be able to experience all things, know
all things and perhaps to enjoy everything possible that life has to offer
in its unlimited variety. In the past the ideal of the Renaissance Man was
taken seriously because it was then still possible for one person to master
all fields of knowledge and to enjoy all kinds of artistic creations that
were in existence at the time. However, in today’s world that has not
been possible at all because of the tremendous explosion in all branches
of knowledge and in creative works, so there is simply not enough time
for an individual person to master them all. From this observation
Horrobin then argues that life is worth being expanded indefinitely. Given
that the current human enhancement technologies might start to make
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this seemingly unrealistic scenario a reality, this demands a response from
the Buddhist. In a nutshell, Horrobin is arguing that life is intrinsically
valuable because it gives us the chances to enjoy so many things; hence
extending life is valuable because it gives us more chances. Ideally be-
coming immortal would then be the ultimate good because it gives us an
unlimited amount of time to experience and to enjoy an unlimited num-
ber of things.2
Note that Horrobin emphasizes one’s experiences and enjoyment
of life that requires that there be one and the same person who does the
experiencing and enjoying. For Horrobin it is not possible for there to be
a series of persons who live successively and who experience things in
turn. The reason is that some kinds of enjoyment require that one spends
a long amount of time on education and training which would make it
possible for the person to enjoy those things in the first place. A person
may not be able to appreciate the intricacies of Bach’s music on the first
hearing, but after repeated trainings and experiences the person may start
to enjoy Bach’s music fully. Thus Horrobin’s view requires that there be
one and the same person whose lifespan should be expanded.
This view is in stark contrast to the Buddhist one. Firstly, Bud-
dhism holds that even at a moment of time it is unwarranted to hold that
there is a personal identity, since the person is a process, something com-
parable to a flowing river. Thus the Buddha and Heraclitus share this
important aspect of their thinkings in common, as when Heraclitus says
that one cannot step in the same river twice. Horrobin, however, may
object that his view does not require that a person must be a self-subsist-
ing entity. In fact Horrobin also argues that the person is a process and it
is by virtue of the person’s being a process that lets him or her enjoy and
experience all that life has to offer (desirably indefinitely) (Horrobin
2006a; 2006b). However, as Horrobin’s argument against the series view
of persons makes clear; in order for one person to be able to enjoy and
understand all of Bach’s music, one has to undergo rigorous musical
training, and in order to enjoy all of Bach's music and its perhaps unlim-
ited depth in full, one has to be able to live longer than a normal human
being does. Hence a person may be a series but Horrobin’s view requires
that the person in question has to be one and the same; in other words
even if the person is a process, there has to be a core identity behind this
process which enables the process itself to be part of one and the same
person. Without such a core, the carrying over of identity across time is
not possible. For Horrobin the desired picture is that of a man or a woman
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who can live, say, for two hundred years, enjoying all the niceties of life
and learning all the knowledge that there is to be learned. The man or the
woman here, then, has to be one person.
This is the type of view that Buddhism has troubles with. A key
component of Buddhist philosophy is that for any thing whatsoever, one
cannot find a substantive core for such a thing such that it functions as
the seat of identity for the thing itself. In other words Buddhist denies
that there be anything comparable to Aristotle’s “the what-it-is-to-be” or
an essence that functions as the core identity of a particular thing. This is
the main contrast between Horrobin’s view and the Buddhist’s. In argu-
ing for the kind of person that is able to enjoy all the experiences that the
extended lifespan will bring, Horrobin presupposes that there must be an
enduring person, even though he argues that the person is essentially a
process. The Buddhist, however, refuses to acknowledge that there be
such an enduring person. Instead what we normally take to be a person,
for example when we refer to others using personal pronouns, is only,
ultimately speaking, what appears to our perception and functions in our
daily lives as though they are enduring entities. Behind these appear-
ances, however, there are nothing but episodes of mental and physical
events that all together make up, to the perceiving mind, the appearance
of a person.
There is obviously not enough space in this paper to lay out this
important Buddhist view in any detail. But at least we can see it relies on
analysis. When one pares down a person one finds nothing that functions
as the core that serves as the seat of the identity of the person. For ex-
ample, when one pares down someone’s body, one finds nothing but
bodily parts, none of which looks like the core seat of identity. The brain
seems to be the most promising candidate, but even the brain, physically
speaking, is merely an organ and does not remotely resemble the person
whose brain it is. Alternatively, the analysis might also be directed at the
mind. But when we were able to inspect our own mental content, we
would find that the content consists of ever changing episodes of mental
events, such as memories, desires, passing thoughts, plans, ruminations,
and so on, none of which appears to be the core seat of identity either.
Thus the Buddhist concludes that the belief that there be a core seat of
identity which functions as the essence of the person himself or herself is
an illusion created by our habits. This is a very complicated argument.
But for the purpose of this paper, we can see that, if the Buddhist view is
tenable, this will pose a serious problem for Horrobin’s view.
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But if the person is ultimately a perceived entity, a construction,
then what consequence does this view have on the problem of lifespan
extension? If there is ultimately no person, then what exactly is extended
when the technologies are applied? One might say that, according to the
Buddhist view, no self persists through time. The fact that I very closely
resemble my previous self that existed yesterday shows that there is a
sense in which there is an ‘I’ that endures. But according to Buddhist this
is an illusion. There is nothing that gets carried over from yesterday to
today; anything that looks like there being the same person as the one
who is typing this paper is merely due to a habit that takes up similar
episodes of an event to be an enduring entity. And with the dramatic
changes of aging, then there is a real sense in which I may not be the
same person I am today. If this is the case, then this contradicts Horrobin’s
view that one can maintain one’s identity throughout.
Horrobin argues that extending life is valuable in terms of accu-
mulating the knowledge and experiences that one would not have been
able to enjoy had one’s lifespan not been extended. He dismisses the
series view of person as being “conservative”, and not being able to ac-
commodate his preferred view of being able to enjoy things with the
extended life. For Horrobin life is worth living precisely because it en-
ables one to enjoy the good things, and if there are more good things to
enjoy, then it is good to extend the life so that one is able to do so. Ac-
cording to the Buddhist, however, the question whether human lifespan
should be extended should be based on what kind of motivation lies
behind the attempt to develop the lifespan extending technologies. As in
the case of human enhancement technologies, the Buddhist gives promi-
nence to motivation. Thus the act of extending lifespan is not ethical or
unethical per se, but its ethical value depends on the nature of motivation
behind it. Perhaps one would like to develop lifespan extension tech-
nologies in order to save human beings from extinction (in this case we
need to suppose that all humans have lost their capabilities of reproduc-
ing themselves, perhaps due to all the chemicals that humans have in-
gested throughout the years). However, if the development of the tech-
nologies is such that it responds to the selfish need of someone’s desir-
ing to extend his or her own lifespan simply for the purpose of expand-
ing his or her own time for enjoying the pleasures, then the motivation is
not a wholesome one and hence it is unethical. Since Horrobin’s focus
seems to be mostly the possibility of enjoying the pleasures (and to learn
all the knowledge, which is also a kind of pleasure) that life has to offer,
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then Horrobin’s motivation does not seem to be an other-regarding one.
Instead one would want to extend one’s lifespan only because one wants
to experience more pleasures for oneself. If this is so, then Horrobin’s
view would be criticized by the Buddhist as being “unwholesome”.
Furthermore, there is another dimension of Horrobin’s argument
where he assumes that life has nothing but pleasures to offer. However,
in reality life has both pleasures and pain. Even though tremendous
progress in science and technology has been made which has made ex-
tension of healthy lifespan a serious matter, there is no guarantee that the
extended life will always be pain free. This is because pain is both physi-
ological and mental; both physical and mental factors are involved in
one's experiencing of pain. Moreover, people differ in their perception
and in their threshold of feeling pain. Hence it is difficult to predict that
future life will be always free of pain. Even if all the known physiologi-
cal causes of pain will be eliminated, that will provide no guarantee that
people in the future will experience no pain at all because it is possible
that pain can happen even if there are no physiological causes, such as
when one feels pain in their phantom limbs. If this can be the case, then
Horrobin’s picture of someone living an extended life enjoying all sorts
of pleasures may be too rosy. As pain will almost certainly be with us, it
is possible that in the extended life there will be both pleasures and pain.
This seems to undercut Horrobin’s argument that life is worthwhile be-
cause it gives us only the pleasures. When the pain is factored in, the
worth of the extended life would be the same as the normal, unextended
one. If one lives significantly longer, then one almost certainly experi-
ences both pleasures and pain, just as one experiences both sensations
when one lives the old style, unextended life. Thus the worth of the ex-
tended life is not augmented by the premise that there will be more plea-
sures. Since there will be both pleasures and pain, the two can cancel
each other out, rendering Horrobin’s argument vacant. If there is any-
thing that makes the extended life worth living, it is not the premise or
the promise that it will bring us more pleasure.
Another kind of sensation that could almost certainly happen to
the extended life is boredom. This is easily understandable considering
that one lives far more than what has been possible for humans up until
now. If one were able to live for, say, three hundred years, one might
enjoy all the pleasures and learnings that Horrobin talks about for a while.
But what would prevent one to feel bored by all this? If there is seem-
ingly indefinite time frame open up to someone, there might be at first a
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feeling of elatedness in realizing that one can now experience unlimited
things. But if one feels bored by all of this, then the pleasures will not
seem to be pleasurable any more. This can happen to anybody when they
have too much of good things. The worth of those good things would
seem to diminish. Furthermore, if the time available for someone would
be almost indefinite, then it is almost certain that at some time in his or
her extended life he or she will feel bored. When one is bored, then all
the pleasures that used to excited one will not be so pleasurable or excit-
ing any more.
The situation is different that experienced by someone who lives
in a more limited time frame. For those living the unextended life, they
know that death is imminent. It can happen to them at any time. This
makes them live their lives to the full, squeezing every moment as if it
were their last. In this situation there is no time to feel bored; on the
contrary one would feel very intensely, as if a whole lifespan could be
compressed into only a few hours or minutes. This kind of life, however,
is not available for those who have the extended lifespan, because they
can always postpone any events to a future date.
The point is that the reason for the value of the extended life does
not seem to lie in the putative fact that it can bring us pleasures. More
often than not it will bring us boredom, which can be as bad as pain.
According to the Buddhist perspective, the value of someone’s life, or in
other words the meaning of someone’s life, lies in whether he or she has
pure, altruistic motivation in living the life or not. The life can be short
or long__Buddhism has nothing in principle against the development and
use of lifespan extending technologies, which in fact are subsets of the
human enhancement technologies that we have talked about earlier. In
any case, the meaning and worth of life does not consist in how short or
how long the life is lived, but it does consist in how well it is lived. If the
development and use of lifespan extending technologies arise out of pure
and altruistic motivation, then Buddhism would have nothing against it
and in fact would commend the effort. But if the development arises out
of the desire to continue consuming the pleasures indefinitely, then Bud-
dhism would strongly advise against the attempt. One reason for doing
so would be that it is totally unreliable to predict that one’s life extended
in this way would consist totally of pleasures. At the very least boredom
will set in. An extended life will contain not only pleasures but also pain
and boredom. Moreover, the value of life, either extended or not, lies
more on how well it is lived rather than how much pleasures the subject
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can consume.3
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Endnotes
1There are a number of fine introductions to Buddhist philosophy. One is
Mark Siderits (2007); another is Gethin (1998). These works, nonetheless, do not even
scratch the surface of the enormous amount of literature on Buddhism and Buddhist
philosophy.
2Being immortal in this sense is different from what Floridi (2008) describes
as being ‘e-mortal’ where an “artificial companion” acts as a surrogate to a person and
could even survive the person himself due to large memory storage that contains the
person’s private information. In Horrobin’s sense, being immortal here is that of flesh
and blood. It’s our own body that borders on being immortal, and not of any surrogate.
3The chapter presents how a general tenet of Buddhism would look at these
issues. However, there are obviously a variety of religious viewpoints in existence,
some of which might be similar or different from that of Buddhism offered here. It
would be interesting to see how the values of other religions, such as Christianity,
Islam or Hinduism, would look at the issues of human enhancement and extension of
human lifespan. See, for example, Mark Hanson (1999) for a Christian (Protestant)
perspective of human enhancement, and Athar (2008) for an Islamic perspective on
the same issue.
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